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Introduction
During the early modern period Hamburg developed, alongside London and Amsterdam, into one of Europe’s most 
important—and most interesting—fi nancial markets. Until late in the fi fteenth century it had stood somewhat in 
Lübeck’s shadow; the latter had not only been dominating the Baltic trades but commercial exchange within the 
Hanseatic League in general. But when, at the turn of the century, the rise of the Atlantic economies and European 
overseas expansion gathered momentum, Hamburg would at least in the long run profi t from this development. 
During the Thirty Years War at the very latest Hamburg became a major fi nancial and clearing centre, handling 
goods and foreign exchange transactions for the major powers involved in the confl ict, such as Sweden and France. 
The metropolis at the Alster River had fi nally become established as a fi nancial market of international standing 
in the 1630s, a benefi t that had clearly arisen from the time and conditions of international warfare. Hamburg 
not only was the leading and main fi nancial market within the north of the Holy Roman Empire; it was also now 
the leading fi nancial centre within north-west Europe, ranking third place, initially after Amsterdam and London 
(and in the nineteenth century London and Paris respectively). It was only in the later nineteenth century, after the 
German Empire had become unifi ed (again) that Berlin emerged as the main fi nancial market of Germany—but 
still Hamburg would continue to be Germany’s largest and most important overseas port. Thus, over the centuries 
Hamburg developed from a rather insignifi cant regional fi nancial market (which it was in the sixteenth century) into 
Germany’s foremost banking centre and fi nancial market. It was the combination of banking and international cash-
less payment transactions, coupled with a considerable maritime insurance business which transformed Hamburg 
into a very powerful goods and fi nance market of pan-European signifi cance. The following paper will trace this 
development during the early modern period prior to assessing Hamburg’s role within the international economy.
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1. Hamburg as a North-West European Exchange Market1)
During early modern times as well as for large parts of the nineteenth century, Hamburg remained Germany’s most 
important trading centre and seaport. It had also emerged as a central money and exchange market, an aspect that is
borne out by the fact that Hamburg had the greatest number of international quotations among all German exchange
markets (which is an indicator of its strength and role within the international economy).2) No other fi nancial data
series available reach as far back in time as the Hamburg data: whereas some few exchange rate currents are at 
most available for Augsburg, Frankfurt-on-the-Main, Berlin or Breslau, and regular quotations for Leipzig only
from 1766 onwards, data series for exchange rate quotations of Hamburg are fairly continuously preserved from the
second half of the seventeenth century onwards (Some single exchange rate currents even date from the sixteenth
century, but there is a difference between mere quotations and a certain degree of regularity of quotations which
determine whether or not a fi nancial place will become an international fi nancial market).3) For the period between
1668 and 1680, quotations from the Marescoe–David Letters are available, namely those on Amsterdam, London,
Paris and Venice, occasionally even on Antwerp and Rouen.4) The quotations ‘offi cially’ start with handwritten or 
printed exchange rate currents respectively of privileged brokers or publishers in 1710, and with the Preis Courant 
der Wahren in Partheÿen, the offi cial publication of the Hamburg Commerzdeputation from February 10th/24th
in 1735. This price current was published twice weekly, namely on the ordinary post-days and, from 1781, on
Tuesdays and Fridays. From 1790 it was decided to quote the minimum and the maximum rate of a certain foreign
exchange market if the transactions were maintained at different rates.5) With the exception of the Napoleonic era
(1806–1814), the quotations of Hamburg can be documented in full from that time.
The rise of Hamburg as an international exchange market began in the late sixteenth century, when Dutch
merchants, as well as Sephardic Jews from Portugal migrated to Hamburg and brought with them not only their 
fi nancial capital, but also their knowledge about fi nancial innovations. Then, Hamburg owed its great importance
within the international cashless payment system in the 18th century fi rst, to the Girobank, founded in 1619 fol-
lowing the model of the Wisselbank of Amsterdam, through which all exchange transactions amounting to more
than 400 Marks Lubish current money had to be conducted; second, to its bank money which remained stable from
1726/36;6) and—as a result of this—to its increasing capability to grant long-term credit. Therefore “Hamburg oc-
cupied a place in European fi nance similar to that of Amsterdam, in that merchants and brokers in the city served as
the intermediaries in exchange transactions between the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, and the Baltic”.7) The increase
of the trade, above all with the Iberian Peninsula but also with the French Atlantic coast, and the fact that only some
fi nancial crises (1755, 1763, 1799) unsettled the town, were very conducive to the development of the Hamburg
exchange market.8) During the 1790s, when Amsterdam, largely because of the French invasion, and Paris, because
of the interruption of exchange operations owing to the political confusion, were unable to maintain their positions
as central Northwest European fi nancial markets, Hamburg even succeeded for a short time in becoming the most 
important fi nancial centre of northern continental Europe. But this period of success was ended rapidly with the
French occupation of Hamburg and the subsequent suspension of the quotation on London on November 28th in
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1806 due to the Continental Blockade established by Napoleon.9)
Around the mid-sixteenth century Hamburg’s role as an exchange market had still been an all but very regional
one; even exchange relations with the more important fi nancial centres of that time, above all Antwerp, had not 
developed into any sort of pattern that would deserve the term “regular”. Richard Clough, Welsh merchant-banker 
and fi nancial agent for Sir Thomas Gresham remarked in the 1560s that
Wechselgeschäft mit anderen Plätzen wird in Hamburg nur von wenigen Kaufl euten betrieben, und diese sind 
Fremde, die nicht dauernd [meaning: in Hamburg, M.D.] wohnen. Ebensowenig wird von anderen Plätzen
nach Hamburg gewechselt.10)
At the beginning of the century, still, Lübeck had been northern Germany’s preeminent fi nancial market;
it never emerged into a proper exchange market, however. Hamburg on the other hand managed the successful
transformation over the sixteenth century from an insignifi cant goods and fi nancial market at the beginning to
the leading fi nancial and exchange market of (northern) Germany at the end of the sixteenth century. Price cur-
rents for goods and exchange rates from that era (1592) prove that regular exchange relations were maintained 
with Amsterdam, Antwerp, Middelburg, London, Nuremberg, Cologne, Frankfurt-on-the-Main and Danzig.11)
According to Kellenbenz, in 1603 Hamburg, in connection with the Kieler Umschlag,12) maintained vital exchange
connections with the same exchange markets.13) Clearly the rayon or “fi nancial catchment area” of Hamburg as a
clearing centre was still very limited as it did not extend beyond its immediate economic hinterland (Baltic, North
Sea). Around 1630 then, Hamburg had regular exchange rate quotations on places such as Amsterdam, Antwerp,
Cologne, Middelburg, Frankfurt-on-the-Main, London, Danzig, Lisbon and Augsburg.14) In this way Hamburg’s
foreign exchange relations were geared primarily towards north-western Europe, the Holy Roman Empire, the
Baltic and Portugal; the seemingly strong connection to the Tagus River would have been due mainly to the re-
cently immigrated Jews (the Marranos).15) According to the relatively sparsely-preserved exchange rate currents
there were in the seventeenth century regular exchange rate quotations on Venice, Antwerp, Amsterdam, London,
Paris, Rouen, Nuremberg, Frankfurt-on-the-Main, Leipzig und Naumburg, Breslau und Danzig, and after 1672
also Seville, Cádiz, Copenhagen and Lübeck.16) In the eighteenth century exchange rates were quoted regularly on
north-western European places such as Amsterdam and London, in France on Paris and (from 1724/37) Bordeaux,
in Italy on Venice (and since 1796 also Genoa and Leghorn); and on Cádiz and Lisbon (and from 1776 on Madrid 
and from 1799 on Porto) in the Iberian Peninsula. Bilbao and San Sebastian in northern Spain were only tempo-
rarily and very briefl y quoted.17) Those exchange rate quotations on the Iberian Peninsula were virtually the only
ones that could be traced for the Holy Roman Empire, even though the bills of exchange and the transactions on
which these quotations were based seldom went to Cádiz and Lisbon directly but were usually routed via the Low
Countries (Amsterdam, Antwerp).18) Their commercial signifi cance, however, is clearly attested by the fact that 
as of fi rst January of 1776 the usance on bills drawn on Spanish and Portuguese places was increased from two
to three months sight (as happened later in the case of Venice and the other Italian places that were added to the
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exchange rate currents subsequently). This was an extension of the line of credit not usually granted on transac-
tions with any of the other northern European fi nancial markets. Only in two other cases the usance on bills was
subsequently extended signifi cantly (from four to six weeks in the case of Breslau and Vienna in 1755 and 1757
respectively; the former due to the importance of the Silesian linen trades). Vienna had been quoted in Hamburg
exchange rate currents from 1718 onwards.19) Places within the Holy Roman Empire that maintained regular ex-
change relationships with Hamburg were the Leipzig and Naumburg (until 1723 only) Fairs; until 1755 Nuremberg
and, to a lesser degree, Augsburg. Prague was added to the list in the 1740s, as was much later (1796–1812) Basle
and Frankfurt with her large fairs (1812). In the Baltic, Copenhagen was the only place on which exchange rates
were regularly quoted from Hamburg over a protracted period (from 1715 onwards). Danzig was quoted from 1717
onwards. Subsequently Rouen, Lübeck, Danzig, Naumburg and Nuremberg were taken off the Hamburg exchange
rate currents, as regular commercial exchange with these places had ceased (and thus the necessity to maintain a
regular exchange rate quotation on these places). Attempts to include Berlin (1765)20) and, in the wake of the fourth
Dutch-English War, St Petersburg (1781) proved abortive,21)
„wiewohl außer diesen noch weit mehr seyn, als Archangel, Berlin, Bremen, Cölln am Rhein, Dantzig,
Franckfurth an der Oder, S[t]. Gallen, Genua, Livorno, Lübeck, Marseille, Mallaga, Riga, Stettin, Stockholm,
Straßburg, und andere mehr, auff welche von Hamburg aus entweder gerade, das ist a droiture, oder vermittelst 
anderer darzwischen liegender Handels-Plätze gewechselt wird.“22)
Exchange rate notations from other north-western European places on Hamburg can be traced from the late six-
teenth and early seventeenth century onwards, in particular from Amsterdam and Antwerp in the Low Countries.
During the seventeenth century Hamburg rose to become the most frequently quoted exchange place within
Germany, with proven notations of exchange rates from Amsterdam, Antwerp, London and Venice. It is likely that 
Hamburg was quoted regularly in most of the other fi nancial markets in the North Sea and Baltic area, too, but also
at Nuremberg, Frankfurt-on-the-Main, Augsburg and, from the later seventeenth century onwards, Leipzig. During
the eighteenth century all of the major north-western European fi nancial markets had exchange rate quotations on
Hamburg, such as Amsterdam, Antwerp, London, and Paris. The French Atlantic port cities of Bordeaux, Nantes,
Lorient etc. quoted Hamburg regularly, as did Bolzano (Italy) between 1742 and 1749 (and after that less regularly).
Venice, Leghorn (since the 1750s), Naples (sporadically from the 1780s onwards) and Genoa (since the 1790s) were
the larger Italian fi nancial markets that had exchange rate currents quoting Hamburg regularly, as most of the larger 
fi nancial places within the Holy Roman Empire. In the Baltic, Hamburg was quoted in that way from Stockholm,
Riga, Danzig, Königsberg und Copenhagen. From the 1790s onwards there even were infrequent quotations from
places within the United States, especially Philadelphia, New York and Boston.23) The latter need to be seen in
connection with the establishment of commercial exchange relations between Hamburg and the areas that had only
recently become independent from British rule. In Spain an offi cial exchange rate quotation on Hamburg is notably
absent from Madrid documents, even though it seems likely that such a quotation might have featured in the private
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exchange correspondents between the merchants involved in exchange between Hamburg and Spain. Some records
dating from the late eighteenth century suggest that within Russia regular exchange rate transactions, manifested 
in quotations on Hamburg, had switched focus from Arkhangelsk to St Petersburg. The background to these shifts
needs to be seen in the instability of the Holländische Bank, as well as the fact that remittances to Holland and 
England were somewhat put in danger by the Napoleonic Wars and the numerous confl icts of that age. Payments
and transactions involving England were now increasingly re-routed through Hamburg, as noted by Baasch.24)
In this way Hamburg’s fi nancial “catchment area” was considerably extended since the second half of the
seventeenth century; especially with places in Italy and the Iberian Peninsula. In the eighteenth century north
Germany’s largest sea port emerged as a fi nancial centre of international standing, connecting the major European
fi nancial places and towards the end of the century even places overseas, both in terms of exchange rates involving
transactions with Hamburg merchants or just in terms of a fi nancial intermediary. By means of the fi nancial relations
with the Iberian Peninsula Hamburg acted as a clearing centre for fi nance and bills that involved the Empire, as
well as places outside Europe, especially the New World. However, the major share of fi nancial exchange involving
Hamburg still focused on “traditional” markets such as Amsterdam, London and Paris, and, since the mid-eighteenth
century onwards Bordeaux which had by that time become France’s chief sea port and centre of re-export trades.
There were several usances on bills involving Bordeaux. Within the Empire exchange relations focused on the big
trading centres in the south, as well as Leipzig and Breslau—providing a gate towards trade with Eastern Europe;
Vienna and Prague were used as inroads for commercial exchange with the Habsburg monarchy. The opening of 
the Friedrich-Wilhelm Canal providing a direct waterborne connection between Silesia with the North Sea (1668)
led to an increase in the degree of commercial exchange between Hamburg on the one and Saxony and Silesia on
the other hand. This also led to an intensifi cation of exchange relationships of Hamburg with Breslau and Leipzig.
“The result was not only a displacement of Nuremberg, Augsburg and Frankfurt by Breslau and Leipzig, but also
the decline of south German trading houses, in favour of Hamburg merchants”, as Karin Newman has written.25)
Prague became increasingly signifi cant as a fi nancial place, as a considerable share of payments for Silesian linen
that was routed through Hamburg was settled using bills that were drawn on Bohemia, as Baasch noted.26)
In the wake of the French occupation of Amsterdam (1794) the international trade in commercial bills relocated 
north towards Hamburg, providing a considerable stimulus to the Free City’s commerce and fi nance.27) The visual
expression of this structural shift was the adoption of exchange rate quotations on places that had not been formally
quoted at Hamburg, but which had regularly featured in Amsterdam and London exchange currents (places such as
Genoa, Leghorn and Porto). Basle was quoted from 1796 on, whence French money markets had partially located 
in the wake of the Assignats fi at money infl ation in France. Between the mid-1790s and 1806 (French occupation)
Hamburg had fi nally, if yet briefl y, risen to northern Europe’s predominant fi nancial market (Ernst Klein).28)
This central role and position of Hamburg as the major fi nancial market in the North German/northwest 
European and Baltic area is highlighted by the fact that many of the regional and local fi nancial markets gradually
adjusted to the patterns and usances of the Hamburg money and exchange market. It was said about the Rostock 
(a port in the Baltic) merchants that “[t]hey draw upon London, Hamburg, and Amsterdam, the same as Hamburg
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courses in general, but send their drafts to be negociated at Hamburg.”29) The same applies to Lübeck: “Lubec draws
on other places in the same manner as Hamburg.”30) Lübeck only had an exchange rate quotation on Hamburg and 
Amsterdam.31)
Hamburg remained Germany’s largest and single-most important overseas port in the nineteenth century, in
the same way as it had been in the eighteenth century. Until the unifi cation of 1871 it remained Germany’s most 
important fi nancial market; it had the largest number of exchange rate quotations on foreign places of any of the
other German fi nancial markets.
From 1815 onwards Hamburg regularly quoted Augsburg, Frankfurt-on-the-Main, Leipzig, Breslau,
Copenhagen, Vienna, Prague, Amsterdam, London, Paris, Bordeaux, Madrid, Cádiz, Lisbon, Porto, Genoa and 
Leghorn (until 1868). Initially, both Frankfurt and Leipzig featured in the exchange rate currents with the usance of 
“fair bills”, meaning that these two were not (yet) regarded as fi nancial markets in a permanent sense. From 1827
onwards, however, both were quoted as proper—permanent—fi nancial markets. Venice had ceased to be recorded 
in the exchange currents as of 1802. Thus, Hamburg was the only northern German fi nancial market with regular 
quotations on Bordeaux—the foremost Atlantic port city and entrepôt of France, as well as the Iberian Peninsula
and some of the Italian markets. In the 1820s and 1830s there was yet another considerable augmentation of 
Hamburg’s fi nancial “catchment area”, when St Petersburg (1821), Antwerp and Bilbao (1825), Trieste (1828) and 
Berlin (1836) were fi nally added to Hamburg’s exchange rate current (Bilbao would be quoted regularly from 1828
onwards).32) Whilst Antwerp was included (again) on the offi cial exchange currents only after extensive negotiations
and deliberations between the Commerzedeputation (chamber of commerce) and Hamburg City Council, the plan
of including Brazilian exchange rates (1827) was not even contemplated on the part of offi cials. When some of 
the larger Swedish merchant bankers applied for a regular exchange rate quotation for Hamburg on Stockholm in
1863, this application proved unsuccessful (such an exchange rate was only established in 1881). Bremen was only
included in regular quotations in 1859; until that date Hamburg merchants apparently had—quite successfully—re-
fused to acknowledge Bremen as a fi nancial market on equal footing.33) From the late 1860s onwards supplementary
exchange rate quotations on places other than the respective main fi nancial centres of the countries under consider-
ation were added to the Hamburg price current (under the heading “andere Bankplätze”). In this way the notation
of “other banking places in Prussia” (“Andere preußische Bankplätze”) replaced the former quotation of “Breslau”
(whilst the notation of Berlin remained fi rmly in place), in the same way as “other places within France” were
intended to replace “Bordeaux” (whilst Paris remained in the exchange current). The “Andere österreichische
Bankplätze” (other Austrian banking and fi nancial centres) now covered Prague and Trieste; “other banking and 
fi nancial places in Saxony” now presumably covered mainly Dresden (which was not even a fi nancial centre in the
proper sense). Hamburg on the other hand was quoted by all major fi nancial places within Germany (at that time
there was no such thing as a German state, but several political unions: here the German Confederation/Deutsche
Bund) and, on top of that, all major international fi nancial markets of the day (since the later seventeenth century).
The ties with overseas fi nancial markets, such as the big port cities on the Atlantic sea coast, such as Philadelphia,
Boston and New York (since the 1790s), as well as Rio de Janeiro (since 1829/36) and San Francisco (since 1850)
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had only been forged very recently (to name but the most important ones).34)
Like Frankfurt and Leipzig, Hamburg also had to accept a considerable weakening of its position as a Central
European exchange market in the nineteenth century, although it remained the most important German seaport and 
trading centre. Consequently, international and—towards the end of the nineteenth century—even intercontinental
quotations for bills of exchange on Germany were no longer primarily given on Hamburg but increasingly on Berlin
or on “German banking places” and on “Germany” respectively, i.e. Hamburg, Berlin and to some extent several
other places (especially Frankfurt-on-the-Main). The reason for this development lies in in the fact that after Prussia
had gained hegemony in Germany and, above all, after the Empire had been founded in 1871, Berlin became the
most important fi nancial centre of Germany.
2. Hamburg as a Supra-regional Banking Place: 
The Girobank as a Public Exchange and Loan Bank35)
The creation of the Hamburger Bank in 1619 was signifi cant and had a considerable impact far beyond Hamburg’s
immediate fi nancial and geographical environment as this represented the fi rst (and in the long run sole) successful
attempt at setting up a communal bank in the Holy Roman Empire during the seventeenth century (apart from the
Nuremberg Banco Publico which, however, established in 1621, proved to be of only a very limited and regional
importance). Hamburg had by now achieved a role of pre-eminence alongside the “bigger players” in the fi nancial
game, such as Venice and Amsterdam, big cities and trading places where communal banks had been established in
a similar way in 1587 and 1609 respectively with the chief goal of stabilizing their currency and payments mecha-
nism in times of currency debasement and monetary instability. Hamburg, Venice and Amsterdam even became
sort of a standing term, a triad, so to speak, as these three would always feature alongside one another in the main
encyclopaedias and handbooks for merchants, when it came to naming successful attempts at monetary stabilization
and integration in Europe and examples of successfully created communal banks. Venice’s Banco della Piazza di
Rialto and the successor, the Banco (del) Giro; Amsterdam’s Wisselbank and the Hamburger Bank were seen by
many as pioneer foundations. The Hamburg Bank clearly had the longest life of all, as it remained in place from its
inception in 1619 until 1875, when it was taken over by the Reichsbank effectively as a branch—the others ceased 
to exist during the Napoleonic Wars.36)
The foundation of the Bank in 1619 came after a prolonged period of germination; it was modelled on the
example of the Amsterdam Wisselbank. Similar as in the case of the Netherlands Hamburg had experienced a
protracted period of progressive currency depreciation especially after 1610 (due to the debasement in particular 
of the petty coins that were in circulation in Germany these days). Progressive small change debasement was a
phenomenon that haunted Europe these days and led to an ever-increasing discount of small change over full-
bodied coins (which means that over time more and more petty coins were given over the offi cial exchange rates so
as to compensate for debasement). The Rixdollar (Reichsthaler) was appreciating especially fast when expressed 
in terms of small change or petty coins and the mark-up (agio) on payments in debased coins was increasing ever 
so fast so as to make an institution providing monetary stability particularly desirable.37) The Empire at that time
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was organized in ten so-called imperial circles, subsidiary levels of administration that were based essentially on
co-operation between the territories, princes and states that constituted each “circle”. The Imperial Circle of Lower 
Saxony (Niedersächsischer Reichskreis) had been negotiating about a unifi ed approach to monetary policy with the
aim of establishing some sort of monetary or currency union in these parts of the Empire since 1617 on its meeting
at Brunswick—yet to no avail. A unilateral solution to the problem, establishing an own bank for Hamburg single-
handedly, was seen as the only viable alternative. It seems as though it had been especially the corporations of for-
eign merchants that stood behind this initiative to curb monetary instability in these parts of Germany, in particular 
the English Merchant Adventurers (resident at Hamburg since 1611), the Dutch, as well as Spanish and Portuguese
Jews (the so-called Sephardim, see above).38) Some of the traditional native merchant bankers, such as the long-
established merchants trading to Friesland or the Netherlands in general were rather opposed to that scheme as they
had been using small change and petty coins even in larger foreign exchange transactions. The new scheme of the
Hamburger Bank now included the provision that all major foreign exchange transactions involving Hamburg or 
Hamburg merchants had to be made in full-bodied, high value coins only. This put the native merchants under addi-
tional strain as they had to acquire these high-value coins beforehand using the small change which the lion’s share
of their daily transactions would yield them. They felt disadvantaged by the high discounts on these small coins
and the high mark-up they had to pay when exchanging small change against full-bodied coin. Thus they chose to
boycott a fi rst initiative at founding a bank (9 February 1615) on these grounds. Additionally, the proposed scheme
that the Bank should also hold a monopoly over foreign exchange transactions using bills of exchange (including
the compulsory conversion of foreign exchange into Marks Lubish current money) was also voted against by the
native merchants. Finally, however, the negotiations between the foreign merchants (“die fremde Nation allhier”),
the Eldermen, the Churchfathers (Oberalte), the Chamber of Commerce, as well as the City Council resulted in a
broad agreement that an institution regulating payments and increasing monetary stability was utterly necessary.
The Bank’s charter of 1619 was modelled along the examples of Amsterdam and Venice; it stipulated that 
payments above 400 Marks Lubish current money, and all other transactions higher than 400 Marks Bank Money,
were to be made through the Bank. The merchants could draw on their balances using transfers and cheques which
made the Hamburg Bank a proper transfer, exchange and giro bank. This infrastructure of cashless payments set up
by 1619 proved to be of immense value for the performance of Hamburg’s commercial economy, as, in the words
of Sieveking, it greatly facilitated the handling of foreign trade.39) Transfers and endorsements involving balances
not held at the Bank were forbidden. Moreover, the bank remained a venture limited to Hamburg merchants and 
entrepreneurs, as foreigners could not open accounts. The Bank virtually only accepted full-bodied high value coins
(as by the way did the local customs administration); in this way demand for high-denomination coins for transac-
tions remained high. Balances could be settled and transfers made in small change, such as shillings and larger 
groats (Sechs-Groschen-Stücke) only up to a share of fi ve per cent of the total transaction value. When pay-outs and 
disbursements were made in current money, a charge of one tenth of a per cent was applicable; if the drawee asked 
for a certain type of coin or sort of currency payment, such as old Rixdollars Species money, payment was usually
made at a discount (disagio). The bank, however, was bound to pay out the full balance upon call to the holder of 
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an account whenever requested by the depositor. The Bank also took full responsibility for damages and losses
incurred due to fi re and theft. During the fi rst year of business 539 depositors would open an account with the bank;
when the accounts were closed at the end of the fi rst year of operation the balance sheets featured a total volume
of transactions to the tune of more than 16.3 million Marks Bank Money.40) Mostly these were made by immigrant 
merchants, such as the Dutch, as well as the English Merchant Adventurers and Sephardic Jews; as yet the Bank 
was decidedly less popular with the members of the old established native merchant dynasties of Hamburg.
In addition to deposit, transfers and exchange a fourth fi eld of operation was added to the portfolio of the
Bank when on the 20 of November 1619 a loans scheme was set up under which the Bank could provide credit at 
interest to the municipal authorities (mostly these were made in the shape of advances on projected tax income).41)
Moreover credit activities were extended to private individuals who could lend from the bank against security, ef-
fectively a kind of pawn broking to the tune of 75 per cent of the collateral’s market value. The Hamburg bank was
also put in charge of the Hamburg mint with the exclusive right of precious metal acquisition.42) Finally the Bank 
was put in charge also of the public granary inasmuch as it was bound to supply initially 500 last and then 1,500
last of corn at any one time at below-market prices for the provision of the poorer classes of society.
Even though the Bank would record losses in the minting and lending against collateral department in several
runs of years, it proved successful in its task of stabilizing the local Hamburg currency. The large full-bodied coins
retained full convertibility and their function of leading currency. The years in 1672/73 saw a crisis, however,
forcing the Bank to close for more than a year. This was due to the international fi nancial crisis in the wake of the
Franco-Dutch War 1672–1678, when the French occupation of the Netherlands made probable a bank run on the
Amsterdam Wisselbank, and the English government also confi scated the deposits of the London goldsmiths. The
actual cause for the closing of the bank was the announcement of the Dutch ambassador van Amerong to call upon
his deposits to the tune of 120,000 Rixdollars (in anticipation of a charge for assignates to the value of 200,000
Rixdollars). The City Council of Hamburg refused this payment, even though the Eldermen would during the period 
of closure repeatedly draw upon the cash reserves of the bank themselves in return. Individual merchants were only
allowed fractional out payments until the Bank formally re-commenced their business six months later. According
to historian Manfred Pohl this temporary suspension of payments was due to a careful strategy of coping with the
crisis developments on the fi nancial markets, as there is no corroborating evidence for an actual insolvency of the
Hamburg Bank.43)
The following decades witnessed several readjustments of the bank charter (initial revisions had been taking
place in 1621, 1636 and 163944)) to changed conditions on the interregional money markets. The handling of public
grain provisions was in 1699 put under a different authority, after problems had been experienced with repayment 
of a loan to municipal authorities for corn. The Bank gained additional support from the Hamburg Chamber of 
Commerce (Commerziendeputation). It was pointed out that this branch of activity might jeopardize the fi nancial
strength of the Bank when it came to fulfi lling the requirements derived from their core branches of activity; com-
parisons to similarly failed schemes were made with regard to London, Venice and Nuremberg. This readjustment 
was formally revoked by an ordinance of 1719; by the same ordinance the rate of interest on short-term loans (six
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months) against security was reduced to two per cent. Now collateral, as the merchants themselves desired, had to
consist of precious metals and copper, as Hamburg was one of the predominant northern markets for copper at that 
time.45) During the eighteenth century the Bank would continuously support the municipal authorities in payments
and other transactions; as Sieveking stressed, the Bank provided the vital life-line of the City of Hamburg and her 
fi nancial policies in times of economic and fi nancial distress.46) Accordingly the debts of the City Council with the
Bank increased markedly over time; in 1760 the level of debts had surpassed the one-million Marks Banko mark.
By far the lion’s share of the Bank’s transactions was accounted for by transfers and settlements, for which
printed standard forms had been in use since 1621. It was comparatively diffi cult to make pay-outs, as the Bank 
closely safeguarded their cash balances. It was offi cial policy to retain as large a balance of full-bodied coins as
a reserve as possible. Payments must not exceed a total of 200 Rixdollars daily at any one time, as the statutes of 
the Bank had it; if out-payments had to be made they should preferably be made in small change and petty coins.
Anyone willing to make a withdrawal was held accountable for re-payment in good coins; withdrawals had to be
announced in advance including a statement as to the exact purpose and reason for these. Exports of currency be-
yond the boundaries of the Empire were prohibited as of 1727; it was especially the nineteen local Jewish merchants
of Hamburg who were suspected of withdrawing more cash than they would put into their accounts with the Bank.
A statistical survey dating from the early 1730s proved that this was the case, as withdrawals exceeded deposits,
as it appeared, by a factor of about 2.4. Withdrawals increased and became more frequent over the 1730s, almost 
leading to a closing of the Bank yet another time in May 1734. Between 1733 and 1745 withdrawals amounted to
a total of more than 2.9 million Rixdollars whilst deposits only came to about 1.1 million dollars (even though the
amounts would fl uctuate of the years).
This was due to a large extent to the on-going monetary dispute between Hamburg and Denmark between 1717
and 1736. Since 1695 Hamburg had ceased to mint an own currency; instead foreign coins from the adjacent ter-
ritories had been freely admitted into circulation. But when Denmark commenced in 1710 with a seriously debased 
petty coinage, the Hamburg Bank money gradually appreciated against the current money in circulation, leading to
considerable monetary imbalances from 1717 onwards at latest. This resulted in an attempt at minting actual coins
at Hamburg in 1725/26, thus introducing a proper currency along the existing Hamburg Bank money of account, for 
which a separate bank, the Courantbank was established. On 15 November 1726 the new Hamburg currency was
set at a fi xed exchange rate or 16 per cent mark-up (agio) against the Bank Money. The consequence was a Danish
embargo relating to monetary transfers as well as the commodity trades, which apparently hurt the Hamburg com-
mercial interests in such a way that all restrictions on the circulation and acceptance of Danish money in Hamburg
were waived in 1736 (April 28), in particular the fi xed mark-up or agio on Hamburg Species Bank money against 
current money (1737). The Courantbank was closed the very same year. Denmark in turn guaranteed the minting
of full-bodied coins stable in value. From that date onwards Hamburg Bank money was regarded amongst the most 
stable and highly reliable currencies in Europe, until a further crisis set in during the 1750s when Bank money again
depreciated against Species money by 12 to 18 per cent and the mark-up of Bank money against current money
had also come down to only about seven per cent (1759). Balances were increased by the sale of collaterals in 1760
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which led to a revaluation of Hamburg Bank Money (a decrease of the discount against Species money in the order 
of 0.5 to one per cent). In 1765 both currencies exchanged at par value. The international fi nancial crisis of 1763
which saw close to one hundred (97 to be precise) established Hamburg merchants and companies go bankrupt thus
had no grave or long-term effects on the commercial standing of the Hamburg Bank.
When after the crisis, in 1766 and 1767 larger withdrawals were made possible again and consequentially
Bank Money again depreciated against Species Money, leading to a temporary closure of the Species cash depart-
ment (not the Bank itself!) until late 1768 it became more and more evident that reforms, which had been discussed 
here and there, were by now over-due. Now, in the 1760s, people began to talk about accumulating gold reserves,
in the same way as this had been done by the “mother bank” and example of Venice, as well as the “older sister” in
Amsterdam and the “little sister” at Nuremberg (as the contemporary correspondence went).47) Public discourse on
these matters became dominated by the writings and petitions of Nicholas (Nikolaus) Gottlieb Lütkens and John
(Johannes) Schuback. Lütkens was member of the Commerzdeputation (1754), Bank Burgher (1761) and Elderman
(Oberalter, 1770); Schuback also was a member of the Commerzdeputation (chamber of commerce).48) The 1770
reform accordingly brought several important changes for the Bank and her transactions. First, all loans given to
Hamburg city council from now on had to be ratifi ed by the Commerzdeputation, a prototype and predecessor of 
the later Chamber of Commerce of Hamburg which had been founded in 1665 as a representation of Hamburg
mercantile interest. (Even though, still, large sums were lent to the city council, for example two million Marks
for the settlement of the Gottorf Peace Treaty between Denmark and the Free Imperial City of Hamburg in 1768).
Secondly, as of 18 January 1770 the Bank commenced on accepting silver deposits alongside gold. This measure,
originally intended for one year, was after 1771 regularly prolonged; it was clearly a consequence of the times of 
fi nancial crisis and turmoil of 1755 and 1763. Bullion deposits in silver were rare, however. As long as the old 
Species dollars were still in circulation, and everyone wishing to conduct transactions with foreign countries would 
demand bullion, the old Species dollars would be delivered to the mint for re-coinage into silver bars. When as of 
8 July 1790 only silver bullion was accepted for deposit and the Species cash department was closed accordingly,
the infl uence of the Species dollars as current money to be used for larger transactions and payments waned. A 
pure silver coinage was introduced. From 1780 onwards the price of one mark of pure silver was fi xed at 27.75
Marks Banko, and this proved the foundation of an extremely successful and stable currency that even withstood 
the turbulences of the Napoleonic era. Monetary stability, the main goal that had stood behind all reforms during
the eighteenth century, had fi nally, at the close of the century, been achieved.49)
Even when in the 1780s the volume of loans given out by the bank increased again, this increase in withdraw-
als was more than made good for by deposits of bullion (silver) which clearly exceeded withdrawals. At that time
uncoined silver (bullion) considerably gained in importance over coins. Whilst coins around 1780 would have ac-
counted for about 28 per cent of the bank’s liquid assets this share was cut by one-half further towards the end of 
the century (down to about 15 per cent). Most of the bullion reserves consisted of fi ne silver and Species Dollar;
raw silver and other of the bank’s assets, such as government loans, private loans against collateral, as well as corn
and meal only accounted for a minority value of the bank’s assets.50)
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As Sieveking noted, amongst all branches of commercial activity the transfer and giro banking was paramount 
at the Hamburg Bank which made it a very different venture from comparable municipal banking foundations such
as the Stadtbanko at Vienna (1703) or the Preußische Bank at Berlin (1765).51) The Hamburg Bank became an
ever-more important economic actor in the City’s economy and commerce, as borne out by the signifi cant increase
of assets and turnover, which rose from 182 million (1751) to 900 million Marks Banko in 1798. On a per capita
basis this increase was formidable, as during the same time the number of merchants operating an account with
the Bank had ‘only’ increased from c. 700 to eight or nine hundred persons. The total value of deposits and bank 
assets, the so-called Bankroulance (i.e. total turnover) had at the same time increased from 5.7 to 17 million Marks
Bank money.52) Between the early 1770s and 1800 the total volume of transactions had increased about four-fold 
(1774: 232 million Marks; 900 million Marks, 1798), an aspect that is clearly attributable to the rise of giro banking
(the most important branch of activity). This was refl ected in the tripling of the Bankroulance over the same period 
(1774: 6.1 million Marks to 17 million Marks in 1798). This was a token of a signifi cantly increased velocity of 
money, particularly due to the fact that for a short period during the 1790s Hamburg became Europe’s most impor-
tant fi nancial and exchange market, when Amsterdam and the Wisselbank had declined in importance in the wake
of the French occupation (see above).53) But especially after 1794 there was a massive increase in exchange transac-
tions handled at Hamburg—clearly attributable to the collapse of the Amsterdam fi nancial market. Accordingly the
value and volume of assets of the Hamburg Bank signifi cantly increased, as did giro banking activities. The silver 
account of the Bank grew by a factor of 3.5 over the 1790s alone (before, however, it was reduced again after the
1800s due to an increased number of loans given out).
In the night from the 4th to the 5th November 1813 the cash balances of the Bank (value: more than six million
Marks) were confi scated by the French. But this was only a temporary interruption, however; immediately after 
the French had withdrawn the Bank re-commenced their activity and the total value of assets stood at 9.76 million
marks at the end of 1814, at 10.96 million marks in 1815 with 6.67 million pertaining to the silver accounts (61
per cent) and the rest (4.4 million Marks or 39 per cent) to the loans department (Lehnkonto). Over the rest of the
nineteenth century the Bank’s activity focused on transfer and giro banking, as well as the trade in bullion (silver);
copper deposits had almost, and the corn trade had completely vanished from the range of activities. The discount-
ing of bills was not yet an option to be taken.
3. Hamburg as an Emerging Maritime Insurance Market
The third area in which Hamburg played a somewhat innovative role in commerce and services was the maritime
insurance business. Insurance had only become important rather late at Hamburg, since the later sixteenth century.
The business had been set up in the wake of Dutch and Jewish-Sephardic immigration during Eighty Years War or 
the Dutch Wars of Independence against Spain (1568–1648), particularly the fall of Antwerp. With the immigrants
came ‘capitalists’ who brought their know-how, as well as innovative fi nancial techniques with them, not least with
regard to the maritime insurance business. The foundation of the English staple contributed to an environment 
favourable to the development of a maritime insurance market, which kicked off in 1568, whilst remaining in the
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fi rst decades entirely in the hands of the Dutch and the Sephardic Jews from Portugal and Spain. Not least this is
borne out by the fact that the language used and the usances on bills and fi nancial instruments were—at that time—
profoundly and exclusively Dutch still. Most of the insurers of that time can be without the slightest doubt identifi ed 
as either “Dutch” or “Portuguese”, i.e. Sephardic Jews from the Iberian Peninsula. Most of the insurance premiums
were settled on long-distance voyages, to the Iberian Peninsula and Norway, for instance whilst short-distance trips
within the North Sea basin, for instance to Dutch ports, would normally use the coastal routes through the mud fl ats
(Wadden sea) where the larger ocean-going pirate vessels and privateers would have only little effect. Moreover 
Dutch men-of-war controlled this area quite effectively, making the North Sea passages comparatively safe and 
secure. Connections to Portugal and Spain on the other hand—Hamburg’s chief overseas trading connections dur-
ing the seventeenth century which were largely operated by native merchants from Hamburg—were somewhat 
jeopardized by the activities and presence of Atlantic privateers, as well as the Barbary pirates which consider-
ably increased insurance premiums on voyages to Iberian sea ports.54) As Kiesselbach notes, the bulk of Hamburg
maritime insurance premiums was settled on voyages to Spain and Portugal. Others were far less relevant.55) The
Barbary pirates were, alongside the numerous wars fought amongst the larger Atlantic powers England, France and 
the Netherlands, a force constantly to be reckoned with. In order to curb these activities and accordingly reduce the
risk premiums on trade with this area the Hamburg Admiralty was founded in 1624, coupled with the (largely un-
successful) re-organization of convoys and armed escorts for merchant maritimes. Especially when the other states,
say, the Netherlands, had recently made peace with the Barbary states and the latter now turned against neutrals
such as Hamburg, insurance premiums would go up and be three times as large as those quoted, say, at Amsterdam.
When in 1662 a fl eet of eight Hamburg merchant maritimes was brought up by pirates from the Barbary Coast,
insurers at Hamburg straightforwardly declined to underwrite any further voyages to that area at whatever cost.
The convoying system was introduced as a consequence by which each merchant fl eet was to be accompanied by
two warships. Whether or not a ship sailed in convoy would now directly infl uence the insurance premiums—if a
ship did not sail in convoy the premium would go up by as much as 400 per cent.56)—Hamburg insurers ‘exported’
their services beyond the boundaries of the free imperial city. Especially Lübeck merchants were happy to draw on
Hamburg for insurance, with Lübeck at that time still by and large being the only maritime insurance market in the
Baltic.57) It is possible that a subsidiary maritime insurance market modelled on the example and dependent upon
the Hamburg market might have been established at Bremen during the seventeenth century.58)
Within an international comparison with Amsterdam and London, however, Hamburg ranged far behind these
two large fi nancial and trading centres. Nonetheless, fi rst attempts at creating a maritime insurance business based 
on stock market shares were made as early as the 1720s. This might have been an attempt to bypass the over-mighty
Amsterdam maritime insurance market and the dependency on Dutch credit for their commercial transactions.
As lots of the commodity transactions were fi nanced with credit obtained at Amsterdam, Dutch creditors more
often than not also acted as insurers for the very same cargoes for which they provided credit. But the attempt at 
setting up a joint-stock maritime insurance business were made in vain as yet, as they did not received the sup-
port needed from the Hamburg Senate (which was simply not interested in such a venture).59) The fi rst joint-stock 
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maritime insurance company was founded at Hamburg as late as 1765; more were to follow in 1779, 1782 and 
particularly numerously in the later eighteenth and early nineteenth century. The fi rst foundation was the result of 
the fi nancial crisis of 1763 which had caused several local companies and partnerships to go bankrupt; with this
joint-stock company—and an accordingly large capitalization—much larger ventures could now be underwritten
than previously possible. This in turn greatly facilitated the entry into the trans-Atlantic trading business for the
larger Hamburg shipping companies.60)
Clearly the most important source we have on the growth and development of the Hamburg maritime insur-
ance business are naval insurance premiums. Market transparency and symmetrical information was increased by
the introduction of price currents, regularly published lists of current prices for commodities, currencies and other 
exchange rates, as well as insurance premiums on seaborne voyages.61) In this way Hamburg’s role as a market for 
maritime insurance increased in the same way as it developed into a northern centre of communications, postal
and news services.62) The range of quotations for insurance rates provides a good and immediate insight into the
geographical market range or ‘rayon’ of the Hamburg maritime insurance market. As opposed to Amsterdam’s
case—where this geographical or catchment area remained virtually constant from the 1730s onwards—we fi nd 
some notable shifts in the Hamburg maritime insurance market with a marked delay. In the seventeenth century
voyages to the Iberian Peninsula were predominant; regular quotations on voyages to the Portuguese possessions in
Brazil and the Spanish Caribbean were added in 1736 on top. But from the later seventeenth century onwards com-
merce with England and France became ever-more important in the maritime insurance business, too, as refl ected in
the newly-added insurance quotations on these places. Further quotations were added to the list in the seventeenth
century still for ventures to the Mediterranean, the Greenland Seas (whaling and seal hunting), Norway, Sweden
and Arkhangelsk. The Hamburg Price Current which was published since 1736 also featured insurance quotations
on voyages to ports in the Baltic, especially Danzig (Poland) and St Petersburg (Russia), as well as regular quota-
tions on premiums for traffi c to the Netherlands. Only the immediately adjacent sea ports of the other states of the
Holy Roman Empire entered the price currents belatedly. The Hamburg maritime insurance business really took 
off, however, only after the Seven Years War had ended, signifying the beginning of an “entirely new era” that wit-
nessed a considerable increase in the transatlantic trades, as well as—to a lesser extent—exchange with Asia. From
1762 onwards insurance rates on passages to Asia from Portugal, Emden, Gothenburg and Copenhagen were quoted 
in the Hamburg price currents, as well as—for the fi rst time—voyages across the immediately adjacent North Sea
coast (Emden, Eider, Friesland, and Jutland). As noted above, the transatlantic business was considerably facilitated 
by the setting up of a joint-stock maritime insurance company in 1765, an option particularly desirable for Hamburg
merchants after the British colonies on the mainland had successfully gained their independence (1776–1783). The
powerful nexus between war and neutrality greatly undermined Dutch and French credit in the transatlantic insur-
ance business (as well as in many other branches of commerce) and led—in the same way as in the commodity
trade and banking sector—to a big windfall gain for Hamburg merchants and insurers during the periods of turmoil
in the 1770s, 1780s and 1790s, as noted by Kiesselbach.63) Thus in 1782 insurance rates in the Hamburg price cur-
rents were extended yet another time, as desired by the Hamburg merchants, so as to include places such as Ostend 
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(from which passages to England, France, the Iberian Peninsula and the Mediterranean were noted), Trieste and 
Leghorn (on passages to India), Bordeaux (notations on Sweden, Russia and the Baltic Sea ports of the Holy Roman
Empire), London (to places such as Stockholm, St Petersburg and the German ports in the Baltic), Amsterdam
(insurance on travels to St Petersburg, Riga, Memel, Königsberg, and Pomerania), Portugal (into the Baltic,
Königsberg, Riga, St Petersburg), and fi nally, Arkhangelsk (on Amsterdam, London, the Bay of Biscay, Lisbon,
Barcelona and Leghorn).
A direct comparison between the two insurance markets of Hamburg and Amsterdam immediately highlights
two aspects. First, Hamburg caught up rapidly on Amsterdam in terms of rapidly extending the geographical range
of maritime insurance quotations on passages departing from Hamburg after 1730. Secondly, however, the develop-
ment did not stop there. By including insurance premiums on third party trading, i.e. between locations that did not 
involve Hamburg directly (as either a point of departure or arrival) Hamburg supplied vital information about for-
eign markets to the native merchants thus creating an entirely new set and range of business opportunities available
to them. In the 1790s at the very latest, when warlike activities involving the Netherlands commenced yet again,
Hamburg’s political neutrality coupled with the French occupation of the Netherlands so as to produce a unique
competitive advantage in the fi nancial market sector. It seems probable that at that time the maritime insurance
business constituted the major share of transactions made on the Hamburg stock exchange; at least Hamburg clearly
had become the focal market for fi nance and insurance in northern Europe at that time (see above),64) especially
since Lübeck and other ports in the Baltic largely drew on Hamburg for fi nancial services (the local insurance and 
fi nancial markets in the Baltic were clearly not suffi cient to handle the increased demand for fi nancial services such
as insurance).
This fi nancial market and service sector expansion rested on several pillars marked by recent developments
and transformations of the institutional landscape. First, all across the North Sea and Baltic littoral ordinances
regulating the insurance business were issued, not only in north-western Europe (particularly the Netherlands),65)
but also in the economic-commercial periphery, mainly the Baltic, where similar ordinances and regulations were
created in Sweden (1667), Denmark (1683) and Prussia (1727, Prussian Maritime Law, as well as 1766 Maritime
Insurance Ordinance). In Hamburg a similar ordinance dating from 1731, the Assekuranz- und Havarey-Ordnung
made up for what had that time developed into a pressing desiderate.66) Then, in the second half of the eighteenth
century, there were three innovations in particular that proved helpful and benefi cial in terms of widening the insur-
ance market and creating the sort of institutional framework and stability needed for commercial expansion. First,
the big companies appointed agents or commissionaires at the most important places of correspondence who, if 
claims were made on an insurance policy, would provide credit and thus dispensed with the more expensive bot-
tomry loans provided by the foreign fi nanciers which normally put a great strain on the fi nancial reserves of the
Hamburg insurers. In this way the companies could cut their costs which resulted in premium reductions and lower 
prices which they could pass on to their customers in turn.
Secondly, as information travelled faster and faster the speed and density of commercial knowledge—by
publication in the Hamburg Price Current or public notices and tables of prices—was considerably increased. This
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led to a deepening and widening of markets and a signifi cant increase in market integration. Thirdly, and fi nally, a
central scheme for classifi cation of ships was introduced somewhat modelled on the example of Lloyd’s at London
(1764/65) which greatly increased the level and transparency of knowledge regarding the ships that were to be
insured. In this way the risk of the insurer was considerably reduced.67)
The impact on the actual level of insurance premiums was rather humble, however. If at all signifi cant, it 
would be a long term impact. Until the end of the Seven Years War there was not much movement in the maritime
insurance market other than the usual fl uctuations within the year (which followed the shipping seasons). Only after 
the Seven Years War there was a slight reduction of rates during the summer months on voyages to North Sea ports,
north-western Europe and the Iberian Peninsula. Other destinations however, witnessed no real changes; neither 
did premiums on passages during winter time. Needless to say that with the commencement of war in 1792 all
premiums were bound to shot up yet again.68)
Conclusion
Hamburg’s importance as a fi nancial market during the early modern period rested on three pillars: (1) her position
within the international cashless payments system (framed by the bill of exchange); (2) the successful foundation
of the Hamburg Bank founded in 1619 on the model of the Amsterdam Wisselbank through which all foreign ex-
change transactions had to be channelled; her (since 1736) stable Bank currency69) and the resulting possibility for 
the Bank to enter the long-term credit business on that basis; and fi nally (3) her position as an international mari-
time insurance market. As McCusker points out, “Hamburg occupied a place in European fi nance similar to that of 
Amsterdam, in that merchants and brokers in the city served as the intermediaries in exchange transactions between
the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, and the Baltic.“70) All of the relevant fi nancial institutions had been developed in
and adopted from the Netherlands, fi rst Antwerp and then Amsterdam. They were adjusted to the peculiar circum-
stances at Hamburg and further refi ned. Since the later seventeenth century Hamburg had become Germany’s larg-
est fi nancial market with the largest number of exchange rate quotations on foreign places—and the largest number 
of exchange rate quotations from foreign places. The foundation of the Hamburg Girobank for transfers and deposits
clearly helped in that regard; this was the only bank of that type in Germany that had a relevance and range of op-
eration beyond its immediate economic hinterland. By limiting acceptance of securities to silver (bullion) deposits
upon opening account the Hamburg Bank not only proved to be a haven for stability but also a large bullion market 
in north-western Europe. Silver reserves increased, and after the reforms of the 1770s at latest Hamburg gained 
equal footing with Amsterdam and London, the three being the largest bullion markets of Europe. Incidentally this
led to the fact that the Hamburg currency was extraordinarily stable and strong; in the same way as the two public
banks in Amsterdam and Venice had developed into guardians of monetary stability. Hamburg money remained a
“hard” currency until the suspension of the Hamburg currency in 1875. This in turn facilitated the rise of Hamburg
to become the Empire’s, even Europe’s, pre-eminent and most signifi cant foreign exchange market. Flanking that 
development was the growth of the Hamburg maritime insurance business. In much the same way as in the foreign
exchange transactions the geographical range of the Hamburg maritime insurance market, as borne out by the price
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currents, grew constantly and at considerable speed during the eighteenth century, in the end comprising an ever-
growing area and number of regions and places with which Hamburg operated direct trading links. Apart from this,
Hamburg acted as a clearing centre or focal point for foreign exchange transactions and maritime insurance business
in the entire North Sea/Baltic area. The Baltic Sea area used Hamburg as an intermediary for transactions between
the Baltic, the rest of Europe, as well as all places overseas.
Clearly therefore—even though it could not match the world fi nancial centres of London and Amsterdam—
Hamburg ranged amongst the Europe’s largest fi nancial centres. This is borne out by the number—and range—
of quotations of exchange rates on Hamburg from foreign places. Within north-west Europe it was, alongside
Amsterdam, London and Paris, the predominant fi nancial market, in the same way as it was for the Baltic in the
eighteenth century (only to be joined in the nineteenth century by St Petersburg). Apart from Bremen, Hamburg
also was Germany’s only fi nancial market with regular exchange rate quotations on overseas places in the Americas
(such as Brazil and the US), as well as—later on—Asia (Japan). Whilst it remained Germany’s largest and most 
important exchange market until late in the nineteenth century, Frankfurt-on-the-Main became the largest market 
for stocks and shares, obligations and state fi nance, until, after 1871, both places had to step down in favour of 
Berlin as the newly-emerged fi nancial focal point of Germany (by then, Berlin would occupy third place in Europe,
after London and Paris). Nevertheless, Hamburg continued to be Germany’s largest and single-most important for-
eign sea port, handling the major share of Germany’s sea-borne exports and imports. In this way it retained some
standing as an international fi nancial market, with dense commercial relations with the other continents overseas.
And this is a position which it could not possibly have achieved without the three main institutional pillars, i.e.
the mechanisms of cashless payment transactions, her public giro and transfer bank, as well as her standing in the
international maritime insurance business.
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